INTRODUCTION
The discovery provisions in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), and thereafter in most states' procedural codes, were a grand experiment. But the last seven decades have shown that, even by the FRCP's own standards, they are a failure. They have not led to the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," as Rule 1 promised. 1 Instead, discovery is avoided in most cases and ruins many of the rest. Most litigants choose to make their cases discovery-free, finding the process unnecessary, unhelpful, and even harmful.
In contrast, broad discovery has transformed the most important cases: those with the most at stake, addressing society's most crucial issues and involving the best, highest-paid lawyers. These cases now last longer and cost more to litigate. They settle less, requiring more trials and consuming more judicial resources.
There is no reason to conclude that all of this time and expense leads to more justice. Discovery is a powerful weapon for imposing expense and difficulty on an adversary. Plaintiffs and defendants with frivolous cases often use either discovery, or the threat of it, to defeat justice. Plaintiffs with baseless claims wield discovery to coerce in terrorem settlements. Defendants escape liability by imposing oppressive, intrusive discovery requests.
For the lawyers who do not avoid discovery, discovery has made them wealthy and increased their numbers. Because cases last longer and settle less, more lawyers are needed. Each additional dollar of cost that discovery imposes on litigants is another dollar for a lawyer.
However, broad discovery has otherwise deeply harmed the practice of law.
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Some lawyers' new titles reflect this change. Because "trial lawyers" no longer try cases, they are now called "litigators." Elite lawyers now devote themselves almost completely to discovery and other motions based upon it, such as summary judgment motions. This work, although lucrative, is often boring drudgery. Moreover, the use of broad discovery caused the profession to switch from fixed-fee billing to hourly billing. Because broad discovery made a case's expected costs uncertain, the use of fixed fees became too risky. After most states followed the federal courts' lead and began permitting broad discovery in the 1940s and 1950s, the profession switched to hourly billing in the 1960s and 1970s. 2 Like the discovery rules that caused it, hourly billing may have generally increased lawyers' incomes. But it has corroded the legal profession in other 3 ways, making many lawyers miserable, despite their wealth. For example, it has 4 placed many lawyers on a lucrative, but deadening, treadmill in which some lawyers must bill more than 2000 hours per year, often requiring them to spend ten to twelve hours in the office per day, six days per week. Lawyers no longer 5 have time for pro bono or other public service. Moreover, hourly billing rewards 6 inefficiency and creates incentives for lawyers to lie to clients. 7 Broad discovery should be eliminated. It is a seventy-year experiment that has failed. The rest of the world recognizes this; no other country has copied the United States' approach. Moreover, almost from the beginning, discovery's not to file them at all. Third, any problem of defendants' possession of secret documents can also be solved by shifting burdens of proof, as in many countries that prohibit broad discovery.
14 That broad discovery's elimination would be beneficial is confirmed by the experience in the rest of the world. The proportion of lawyers in the population in places such as western Europe is much smaller and the lawyers generally earn less. But the lawyers there also work less and appear happier. A much higher 15 16 proportion of clients pay fixed fees, rather than hourly fees. 17 Moreover, the legal systems in many of these countries appear to achieve bottom-line goals better than the U.S. system. For example, one goal of a legal system is to deter manufacturers, drivers, and others from improperly endangering the public. Although many other factors are also at play, many European legal systems appear to achieve this better than the U.S. system. For example, the automobile accidental death rate in Germany is less than half the U.S. rate. 18 The elimination of broad discovery is not a risky, fringe proposal. Instead, the current U.S. system is the extreme outlier. Eliminating broad discovery would return the United States to the mainstream, with almost every other country. As in other countries, discovery should be strictly limited and allowed only in exceptional circumstances.
The Supreme Court has recently expressed similar concerns about the discovery process and, even more importantly, has eliminated discovery in many cases. The decisions eliminate discovery in many cases; the decisions require early dismissal of certain cases that might otherwise lead to discovery fishing expeditions. My proposal safely builds on the Twombly and Iqbal decisions by proposing elimination of broad discovery in all cases, rather than just some. The decisions moved in the right direction, but did not go far enough. Instead, broad discovery should be eliminated completely.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the history of discovery and its many harmful impacts. Part I also discusses attempts over many decades to fix the system by tinkering with the discovery rules, as well as making changes judicially, as in Twombly and Iqbal. Part II focuses on one of broad discovery's specific impacts: the rise of hourly billing. Part III describes how eliminating broad discovery would provide many benefits and little harm.
I. A GRAND EXPERIMENT OUT OF CONTROL
The discovery provisions of the FRCP were an unprecedented experiment. The new discovery rules transformed the practice of law. However, almost immediately, critics began to note the system's basic flaws. A wide array of fixes have been proposed and adopted. However, these fixes have not worked.
22
Discovery still imposes many harms.
A. A Crusader's Revolutionary New System
The drafters of the discovery provisions of the FRCP knew that their new system was revolutionary and unprecedented. That is, they knew that their new 23 system was a grand experiment. Although some state courts offered isolated discovery opportunities, no state combined them together as did the FRCP. Moreover, many of the state provisions that did exist could not take effect because courts held that federal provisions with no discovery occupied the field, precluding application of the state provisions.
24
The new federal discovery rules were a complete list of all discovery devices that were available in any state and in Great Britain. The approach was revolutionary not only because of the number of discovery devices that were now available, but also because of how easily the devices could be invoked. At the same time, the rules that permitted the discovery devices also permitted what is called "notice pleading." A plaintiff could file a complaint, 34 survive a motion to dismiss, and be permitted to use the discovery devices by providing a complaint that offered merely "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Later courts interpreted this 35 to mean that the complaint could include only the simplest conclusory summary of the plaintiff's differences with the defendants, and needed to include few, if any, facts. The Supreme Court summarized the relaxed pleading standard when it noted the "accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Accordingly, 36 a plaintiff can commence a case with few, or no, facts in hand and instead attempt to gather facts during the discovery process.
The framers knew that their approach was unprecedented. Moreover, they 37 knew that such broad discovery created dangerous risks of abuse. However, as 38 the chief reporter for the FRCP, Charles Clark, later noted, the chairman of the Advisory Committee on these provisions, Edson Sunderland, "had developed both the enthusiasm and the drive of a crusader" to have the discovery provisions 
B. The New Discovery Rules Transform Litigation
The new provisions for wide-open discovery created both opportunities and incentives. First, the new rules greatly expanded litigants' opportunities to obtain information from their adversaries. Second, the new rules created an incentive 46 for lawyers to use discovery, not only to obtain useful information, but also to a gain tactical advantage by imposing large discovery costs on their adversaries. Conducting discovery became expensive, both for the party who sought discovery and for the party who responded to the discovery request.
47
As lawyers exploited the new opportunities for broad discovery, the discovery process transformed the practice of law. Maurice Rosenberg, one of 48 the leading experts on the FRCP and litigation procedure, has noted, "No change in litigation practice resulting from the Rules has had as great an impact as the 39 In addition, broad discovery's impact on the profession grew greater as lawyers gradually began to adjust their professional behavior to the new discovery environment. Even after a jurisdiction adopted wide-open discovery, 63 it could take years for lawyers to learn to exploit fully the opportunities that discovery offered both to obtain information and to seek strategic advantage. 67 Among other concerns, a frequent complaint was discovery's great expense.
68
For example, in 1951, an official for the federal courts wrote: "Today, after thirteen years of experience under liberal discovery rules, complaints are heard. It is said: (1) That discovery is expensive and time consuming out of proportion to benefits; that depositions last weeks, interrogatories and admissions cover thousands of items, and motions to produce call for tons of documents." 69 Similarly, the report from an extensive 1954 investigation concluded:
[T]he average practitioner, in addition to being saddled with such overhead expenses as rising costs of office rents and clerical help, must cope with increased court costs, filing fees and lengthy pre-trial examinations . . . which are generally required in all negligence actions, regardless of the nature of the injury or the amount of the probable recovery. 70 Likewise, a 1957 article in the ABA Journal on the new pretrial discovery rules noted, "Even though the Rules specifically provide protective measures against abuse, embarrassment and undue annoyance, nevertheless not only our own observations but the reported cases demonstrate the terrific time, expense and effort which can be, and are to a significant extent, the results of the procedure outlined in these Rules." of the FRCP had predicted that, although discovery would impose some additional cost before trial, total costs would decline because discovery would cause more cases to settle.
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The prediction was wrong. Both earlier and recent studies demonstrate that discovery did not produce a higher proportion of settlements than would occur without discovery. Instead, at the same time that discovery increased pretrial 74 costs, it decreased the settlement rate, caused trials to become longer, and failed to reduce surprise at trial. Scholars have developed various theories about why 75 discovery deters settlement; including the explanation that discovery appears to create more disagreements than it resolves. Moreover, it appears that once 76 litigants have spent large amounts on discovery, litigants have psychological difficulty in letting go and settling, even when it is in their financial interest to do so.
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Whatever the reasons, the bar recognized that discovery caused total litigation costs to increase. The following conclusion from a 1951 American 78 Bar Association ("ABA") survey was typical:
Discovery does not appear to have been successful in speeding the disposition of cases, for instead the courts seem to have taken over a larger share of the burden of investigation. A comparison between cases with and without discovery in Chicago and Maryland disclosed that discovery is associated both with the cases which take longer to dispose of and with cases which more often go to trial. 79 Likewise, a lawyer from Indiana compared practice in federal court with practice in state court, where discovery was prohibited, and noted, "Our office A survey of discovery practice concluded, "Discovery gives the attacking party more confidence in raising his price for a settlement, but this often has the unintended effect of carrying the case closer to trial." GLASER, supra note 52, at 97. Glaser concluded that discovery leads to new disagreements between the litigants, rather than resolving disagreements. See id. at 91-101; see also generally Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 2204 (arguing discovery raises more new factual issues than it resolves); Shepherd, supra note 47 (noting the discovery rules establish incentives that induce a litigation arms race and deter settlement).
77 tremendous expense, effort and time which can be required of parties involved in litigation," a law firm partner from Pittsburgh wrote in the ABA Journal in 1957 that "it seems clearly evident that in many respects the procedure provided for in the Rules has aggravated rather than alleviated them." A decade later, a 81 survey indicated that discovery costs made up between nineteen and thirty-six percent of litigation costs.
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The new wide-open discovery substantially increased costs in another way: by increasing uncertainty. After broad discovery was introduced, a lawyer was 83 much less certain about the time and expense that a case would require to litigate. Such uncertainty is a real cost. Indeed, the insurance industry is based 84 on peoples' willingness to pay to eliminate such risk.
Although discovery caused litigation costs to increase greatly in some cases, it caused little increase in others. Large average discovery costs hid wide another survey from the same year noted that no discovery occurred in more than half of the cases filed. Likewise, a survey of discovery costs in the early 1960s 89 showed that average discovery expenses were substantial. However, the 90 variation among individual cases was broad. Again, some cases had no discovery, in others it was moderate, and in some it was substantial. A decade later, 91 surveys continued to show that no discovery occurred in more than half of cases and that in cases with discovery, the amount of discovery varied widely. Thus, at the beginning of a case, it was difficult to determine which cases would generate much discovery work and which cases would generate little or none. At the beginning of a case, the attorneys had only a vague idea of how much discovery would occur in that case. A litigant would know, in a general 93 way, that several factors tend to influence a case's discovery amount. For example, research has shown that cases with large stakes or many factual issues tend generally to yield more discovery, while cases with small stakes and few factual disagreements tend to yield less discovery. However, even after 94 considering these predictive factors, substantial uncertainty still remained. 95 Statistical models suggest that, even after accounting for many possible influences on the amount of discovery in a particular case, great uncertainty still existed about that amount. Likewise, a report of a 1963 survey on discovery 96 noted that cases with certain characteristics would tend generally to have large amounts of discovery. However, even after accounting for these characteristics, 97 the survey concluded, "The range in costs is very great in these suits."
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A major reason for the unpredictability of a litigant's discovery costs was that the costs depended not only on the litigant's own discovery behavior, but also on the adversary's conduct. The litigant would need to devote time and 99 expense to respond to each of the adversary's discovery requests. More interrogatories from the adversary would require the litigant to incur greater expense to respond to them. Litigants did not limit their responses to answering the adversary's questions and requests. An empirical study of discovery 100 behavior in 1963 indicates that, in many cases, a litigant would respond to the adversary's discovery in kind. If the adversary served fifty-three discovery 101 requests on the litigant, then the litigant would tend to serve fifty-three discovery requests on the adversary. The additional discovery requests that the litigant 102 served would also require time and expense to draft and they would impose additional costs on the adversary. percent of the cases, the litigant believed that the adversary used discovery not merely to fish for facts, but also to harass the litigant. A 1951 study found that 108 discovery abuse existed, but that its prevalence was uncertain: "Lawyers agreed that discovery devices are used in some cases to harass the other side into a settlement-'to create an atmosphere for settlement' as one phrased it--but they were unable to estimate the extent of this abuse." of discovery requests now certified that they were necessary, and judges were to impose time limits for discovery and stop discovery that was disproportionate. After another decade of dissatisfaction, the federal discovery provisions received seemingly important new changes in 1993. There were numerical 121 limits on depositions, moratoriums on discovery until the parties met and submitted a discovery plan to the judge, and most controversially, mandatory initial disclosures of relevant witnesses and documents.
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After additional discontent, especially with mandatory initial disclosure, additional changes occurred in 2000. The rules limited mandatory disclosure 123 to documents that supported a party's claims or defenses. In addition, the changes narrowed the scope of discovery modestly.
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Despite discovery causing lawyers continual irritation, it produced one great benefit for the profession. As will be seen in a later section, discovery has eventually led to increases in lawyers' incomes and the hiring of more lawyers; which occurred once discovery caused the profession to switch to hourly billing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The combination of discovery and hourly 125 billing was a bonanza for lawyers.
D. The Supreme Court Eliminates Discovery in Many Cases
In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that the decades of tinkering with the rules had not worked. Despite all of the rule changes, 126 discovery abuse was still pervasive. So the Supreme Court effectively eliminated discovery in many cases. It did so not by changing the discovery rules, but by 127 changing the pleading rules to make it much more difficult for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For these cases, the 128 decisions effectively eliminated discovery. supported the system for broad discovery; in many cases, discovery was broad only because the combination of notice-pleading and the discovery rules permitted discovery. Notice pleading and the discovery rules would combine to produce broad discovery in two steps. First, notice pleading would permit a complaint to survive until the discovery process began. Until the two decisions, a plaintiff was 131 permitted to file a complaint that provided the defendant with nothing but minimal notice about the nature of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant.
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A complaint with few, or no, facts would usually survive a motion to dismiss.
Second, when the motion to dismiss had been surmounted, the plaintiff could move on to conduct discovery. The broad discovery rules would then become 133 important, permitting the plaintiff to obtain broad categories of information, including, perhaps, the facts that were necessary to support the allegations in the complaint.
In sum, before the decisions, the combination of notice-pleading and the discovery rules meant that a plaintiff whose complaint contained few facts could conduct discovery. Indeed, the system permitted plaintiffs to use discovery to find the facts to support the complaint. As the Court noted in Hickman v. Taylor in 1947, the system that new the FRCP created was designed to permit a plaintiff to file a conclusory complaint now and then find the facts to support the complaint later in discovery. The Court stated, "No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case." The combination of notice pleading and the 134 discovery rules opened the discovery floodgates.
Twombly and Iqbal have now, in many instances, closed these floodgates, eliminating discovery in some cases. No longer are fishing expeditions allowed. The plaintiff must now have facts in hand at the time of filing the complaint. The plaintiff may no longer file the complaint first and then use the discovery process to find facts later.
In the two decisions, the Court made it much more difficult for a plaintiff's complaint to survive a motion to dismiss and therefore much more difficult for a plaintiff to be able to proceed far enough in the case to be permitted to conduct discovery. That is, the decisions' effect is to shut off many plaintiffs from access to the discovery process. The two decisions have, in many cases, eliminated discovery just as effectively as would a revision to the FRCP that eliminated depositions, interrogatories, or requests for production. the plaintiff hoped to acquire such evidence during the case's discovery process. That is, the case would have been just the sort of "fishing expedition" 137 that the Court in Hickman in 1947 had said was permitted under the system of notice pleading and broad discovery. The Court's analysis proceeded as follows. First, the court recognized that earlier attempts, noted above, to control and reduce discovery had failed. For 138 example, the Court wrote that increased judicial supervision of the discovery process was no solution stating:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through "careful case management," given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.
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Quoting at length from an article by a federal judge that indicated that better judicial case management could not reduce discovery abuse, the Court noted, "Given the system that we have, the hope of effective judicial supervision is slim." 140 Likewise, the Court indicated that discovery abuse could not be eliminated by either increased use of summary judgment or improved jury instructions: 141 "It is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by 'careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,' much less 'lucid instructions to juries. '" 142 Instead, even with better case management, better summary judgment practice, and improved jury instructions, unscrupulous plaintiffs with frivolous cases could still extort large settlements by threatening to impose discovery expense. The Court noted that, even with the new approaches to control discovery abuse, "the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings." 143 The Court then reached its striking conclusion: to eliminate the possibility of discovery abuse, it was necessary to tighten the pleading standard-here for pleading conspiracy under section 1 one of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The 144 Court indicated that "it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the 135 Cases that failed to achieve this pleading standard would be dismissed and prohibited from continuing on to the next stage where discovery was allowed.
146
That is, a case would now be dismissed if the only way that a plaintiff could win it is to conduct a discovery fishing expedition. The later decision in Iqbal made clear that the new pleading standard applied generally and not just to antitrust cases. 147 Although the opinions in Twombly and Iqbal did not purport to change interpretation of the specific discovery rules, Rule 31 through 36 of the FRCP, they had the same impact in many cases as if the Court had revoked the rules. In many cases in which discovery would have been available before the decisions, discovery is now no longer available; the plaintiff's complaint must now be dismissed before the case reaches the discovery phase.
Twombly and Iqbal represent a fundamental rejection of the discovery system that the FRCP established in 1938 and that the Court had protected for seven decades. Concluding that the existing system created inefficiencies and abuse, and that other judicial and legislative attempts at cures had failed, the Court stopped merely tinkering. Instead, it eliminated discovery for many cases. The decisions represent a fundamental reduction in the number and type of cases in which discovery is available.
The Court did exactly what this Article proposes, except the Court eliminated discovery for only some cases. The only difference between this Article's thesis and what the Court did in Twombly and Iqbal is that this Article suggests that reform should go further and eliminate broad discovery in all cases.
E. Continuing Major Harms
Despite the continued tinkering at the system's edges and despite the changes from Twombly and Iqbal, the system's fundamental structure remains intact. Just as before, litigants in many cases can demand large amounts of information from their adversaries and impose large costs. Thus discovery still imposes the harms about which lawyers and litigants began to complain immediately after 1938. Indeed, changing technology, especially information that is now available in electronic form, has caused the harms to worsen.
148
There are two reasons why the system does not provoke complete outrage. First, lawyers often benefit from discovery because it increases their incomes, although at their clients' expense. Second, the system has existed for so long that most have gotten used to it. Almost nobody is alive who remembers life in the 145 the sample included some cases that had no discovery, a safe conclusion is that, in cases with discovery, discovery on average imposes more than half of all litigation expenses.
In absolute terms, the amounts that discovery consumes are large. The 151 study indicated that discovery, in the median case, consumed approximately three percent of the stakes. That is, in a case with stakes of $10 million, direct 152 discovery expense would be more than $300,000. Other earlier studies have produced similar estimates as to both relative and absolute expenses for discovery.
153
These expenses did not include the costs to the client of disruption from discovery. For example, not included were the costs of company employees' identifying responsive documents. Nor did they include the large costs of the disruption when officers, directors, and other employees must be prepared for and attend depositions. Even apart from the direct legal fees for discovery, the discovery process in substantial litigation can paralyze a company. Although discovery's indirect costs are impossible to measure with accuracy, indirect costs may often exceed the direct costs for attorney's fees.
Such costs might be acceptable if they achieved anything beneficial. However, all of the expense and disruption appears to be counterproductive. For example, a major benefit that the drafters promised for the 1938 federal discovery provisions was that discovery would promote quick settlement. The 154 rules would force each litigant to put his or her cards on the 
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of every action," as the drafters promised in their new Rule 1.
157
The predictions have been wrong. As already mentioned, both earlier and recent studies indicate that rather than increasing the settlement rate, discovery has reduced it.
158
Because discovery makes the litigation process inefficient and consumes so much additional lawyer time, it has increased lawyers' incomes and led to the hiring of many additional lawyers. But the high incomes for a large population 159 of lawyers is at society's expense. Incomes and employment would increase in the nuclear power industry, at least in the short run, if the industry purposefully caused a meltdown. Indeed, higher incomes and employment for lawyers is one of discovery's harms, not a benefit. That lawyers benefit from the waste that 160 discovery causes does not change the fact of the waste.
Moreover, even if one looks only at discovery's impacts on the legal profession-as this Article does in the next section-rather than appropriately on its impact on society as a whole, the other harms that discovery causes more than overwhelm the possible financial benefit that discovery has provided to the profession. The profession, not just society as a whole, is worse off with discovery.
Although discovery is expensive, disruptive, and decreases the settlement rate, it might nonetheless be worthwhile if it produced outcomes with more justice. Occasionally, discovery achieves this goal. For example, plaintiffs in 161 a products liability case may discover the smoking-gun document that establishes the defendant's liability. For example in Grimshaw v. Ford, the plaintiff 162 obtained discovery of an internal Ford document that indicated that the company had, in deciding not to install a cheap safety device, balanced the cost of the device against the value of the lives that might be saved. Likewise, in an U.S.
163
Department of Justice antitrust suit against Microsoft, the government obtained many of Bill Gates's and other executives' internal emails in which they indicated their intention to squash the competition. 164 However, the discovery process often produces injustice instead. Eventually, plaintiffs started to win cases against tobacco companies in part because of internal company documents-although the documents were often obtained by leaks from employees rather than through the discovery process. However, a 165 major tool that tobacco companies had successfully used for decades to fend off 157 in intrusive, expensive discovery requests about the plaintiffs' personal history-such as inquiries into plaintiffs' earlier use of illegal drugs-while at the same time resisting the plaintiffs' discovery requests doggedly. 167 Likewise, defendants in cases involving birth defects and illnesses from birth control devices and drugs used during pregnancy would intimidate plaintiffs with massive discovery requests. The requests would seek disclosure of plaintiffs' 168 sex histories and other embarrassing information. The broad scope of 169 discovery would permit intrusion into these areas, even though the information that was sought was barely relevant. Intimidated and outspent in a litigation war of attrition, the plaintiffs would often abandon the cases or settle cheaply.
170
In many cases, discovery is not a weapon for justice, but for injustice. Indeed, studies show that litigants frequently use discovery not legitimately to obtain necessary information.
Instead, they impose discovery requests 171 strategically to impose costs. Some cases descend into discovery wars of 172 attrition with each litigant attempting to use discovery requests to exhaust the adversary.
No data exists on the relative sizes of the groups of cases where discovery promotes justice rather than deters it. This author's own experience in litigation, augmented by discussions from many other experienced litigators, is that only rarely does discovery produce the smoking-gun document that makes a difference to a case's outcome. Rarely does such a smoking gun exist. If it does exist, photocopy technology often causes it to exist not only in the defendant's internal files, but also in external sources such as the files of lawyers, accountants, or disgruntled employees. In this way, that document would be available even without discovery.
Discovery's usual impact is to either achieve the same result as would have occurred without discovery with much more trouble and expense, or to distort the result away from justice with just as much trouble and expense. A litigation partner in the large law firm of Debevoise & Plimpton while discussing foreign legal systems without discovery noted:
There may be a few smoking guns (more likely, water pistols) that are not unearthed, and perhaps even a few truly meritorious suits that do not succeed. But it is extremely doubtful that these few exceptions justify 166 
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the overwhelming burdens and abuses wrought by our current system of pretrial practice and discovery. 173 Indeed, corporations and wealthy people may use the threat of discovery to intimidate potential litigants into refraining even from filing suit. For decades, many potential tobacco plaintiffs would not sue because they foresaw the discovery barrage that the tobaccos companies and their legions of lawyers would throw at them if they did. Indeed, that was one of the tobacco industry's main 174 tactics: deter additional lawsuits by litigating each one that was filed in the most expensive way possible. A main way of imposing the expense was through 175 discovery.
176
Litigants make the decision whether to sue in the shadow of the discovery process. It is certain that many lawsuits with strong merits that would otherwise succeed are never filed because of the discovery process.
Opportunities for litigants to impose costs and intimidate have further increased in the past two decades as discovery of electronic information has begun. A corporate defendant will fear a request for all of the company's email 177 relating to a certain issue. The review of this mass of material for privilege and relevance would be expensive and time-consuming.
By increasing litigation's costs and the uncertainty of these costs, wide-open discovery has restricted access to legal services for some of society's most vulnerable groups. Both the increase in litigation costs and the increased uncertainty raises the effective price of litigating a case. Those with the least wealth are least able to pay the higher price. By increasing litigation's costs, broad discovery effectively denies these people recourse to lawyers, the courts, and justice.
Moreover, wide-open discovery increases litigation's effective cost most for those who are risk averse and who are thus most sensitive to the risk from discovery. These tend to be small businesses and individuals with few assets, 178 for whom the risk of an unexpectedly large legal bill is unbearable. In contrast, This is true for both potential plaintiffs and defendants. Discovery's expense and uncertainty prevented some plaintiffs from asserting valid claims. For example, a plaintiff who, before the introduction of wide-open discovery, might have sued his or her landlord for illegally failing to maintain his or her apartment now may be unable to afford to sue. Under hourly billing, the potential plaintiff expects even this small case to require a prohibitive number of expensive hours of attorney time, many for discovery. Moreover, although the case might settle quicker than expected, there is also a substantial possibility that litigation costs would explode and drain the plaintiff's assets. Unable to bear discovery's expense or risk, the potential plaintiff may not assert his or her rights. Similarly, the plaintiff is unable to obtain representation on a contingency or at an affordable fixed fee because discovery has increased both the expected cost and the cost uncertainty that attorneys must cover. So plaintiff's contingency lawyers refuse cases that, absent discovery, they would have accepted. Or if fixed-fee representation is available, its price is prohibitive.
Conversely, the cost and uncertainty of broad discovery prevented some defendants from obtaining representation to defend against invalid claims. Some defendants may settle even invalid claims for substantial sums because the settlement sums are cheaper than the large new costs that discovery imposes.
Defenders of the discovery process proclaim as a main argument in favor of the process that most cases have no discovery. For example, Stephen Subrin 182 argued:
What neither foreign commentators on American discovery nor homegrown conservative critics tend to mention is the extensive empirical research in our country demonstrating that in many American civil cases, often approaching fifty percent, there is no discovery, and in most of the remainder of the cases there is remarkably little.
183
That many litigants avoid the discovery process is not evidence that the process functions well. To the contrary, it supports the conclusion that the system functions poorly. If the discovery process were so wonderful, then half of the litigants would not, in effect, choose to opt out of it. Moreover, if discovery were eliminated, these litigants would not miss it at all; indeed, they have taken matters into their own hands and eliminated it in their own cases themselves. That most potential users of discovery avoid it may suggest that something about discovery is very wrong.
Litigants' decision not to use discovery can be explained in two ways, neither of which indicates that the discovery process functions well.
First, some cases may have such small stakes or clear evidence that discovery is not worth its substantial time, expense, and disruption. This is not evidence that the discovery process works well. Instead, it shows that discovery is too expensive, time-consuming, and disruptive for most cases. 
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Second, even if a litigant's case has large stakes and important factual disputes, the litigant nonetheless may seek no discovery for fear that doing so will trigger the adversary to impose expensive discovery requests on the litigant. Empirical studies show an important influence on the amount of discovery that a litigant seeks is the amount his or her adversary seeks, regardless of the litigant's real need for information. A litigant may fear that conducting any This explanation again demonstrates a basic flaw in the discovery process: it can be used not only to obtain information, but also to impose costs and disruption on the adversary. The fact that in many cases these threats balance out to the point that both litigants are intimidated into conducting no discovery shows only that discovery creates a fear of mutual assured destruction, not that the discovery process is a good idea.
Twombly and Iqbal have eliminated some of the harms from discovery. But 187 they have not eliminated all of them. For example, suppose that a case survives to the discovery phase because the complaint offers sufficient facts to satisfy the new pleading standard. Both the plaintiff and defendant may then seek to gain advantage by conducting abusive discovery. Full elimination of discovery's dangers can be achieved only by eliminating discovery completely. Moreover, the uneven prohibition of discovery that Twombly and Iqbal imposed is not ideal. The two cases eliminate potentially abusive discovery by plaintiffs in some cases, but not by defendants. It would be better to eliminate broad discovery for all parties evenhandedly.
2. Effects on Legal Culture and Relationships.-Broad discovery not only increases expense and warps case outcomes. It also corrodes both the practice of law and relationships between lawyers and clients.
First, the discovery process is deadeningly boring. It requires both the creation of mountains of paper and tedious attention to detail. It is not much of an overstatement to assert that it has ruined the practice of law. Before discovery came to dominate litigation, the day-to-day activity in litigation was much more fun. Regardless of their pay, trial lawyers, as they were called then, could growing understanding that much of the discovery contributes little to justice and is used to intimidate adversaries or pad legal bills.
The associate may look longingly at friends who work in practices that include little discovery, such as criminal prosecution or criminal defense, smaller-scale litigation with individual clients, or other work for state and local government.
Second, broad discovery injures the relationship between lawyer and client. So-called "principal-agent conflicts" exist and create opportunities for abuse when an agent who has authority to make decisions on a principal's behalf has different incentives than the principal. For example, much waste may exist in the medical profession because doctors often have broad discretion to decide what procedures and medications to use, but insurance companies pay for them. Because of the principal-agent conflicts, insurance companies appear to mistrust doctors.
The discovery process has worsened the principal-agent conflict between lawyers and clients substantially because it provides lawyers with broad new 
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FAILED EXPERIMENT 489 discretion to spend large amounts of their clients' money. Before 1938, there was little that a dishonest trial lawyer could do to pad her bills. The tasks in a case 197 were relatively set and straightforward. Moreover, as discussed below, 198 litigators were generally paid fixed fees rather than billing by the hour.
199
However, broad discovery's introduction gave lawyers broad new opportunities for exploiting their clients. As lawyers began to be paid by the hour, an unscrupulous lawyer could conduct excessive discovery to increase his or her income. A client would have little choice but to accept the lawyer's decision about the appropriate discovery level, even though the client would know that his or her attorney had an incentive and opportunity to cheat. Some attorneys undoubtedly did cheat; some could not resist an open cookie jar.
The result was a new mistrust of lawyers. The rise of broad discovery 200 occurred at the same time that both the supposed golden age for lawyers ended and public perceptions of lawyers declined. Indeed, lawyers now rank near the 201 bottom of polls on the public's perceptions of ethical behavior, along with insurance salesmen and car salesmen. In all of these professions, the 202 individuals must rely on experts for information in situations in which the expert's interests conflict with the interests of the individual. Perhaps absent discovery, lawyers would be perceived more like members of professions for which the public has greater trust.
203
Third, broad discovery rots relationships among lawyers. Because the amount of discovery to conduct is within each opposing litigant's discretion, a danger exists in every case that the adversary will perceive any discovery request from a litigant as too much. If the adversary is paying his or her attorney on a 204 contingency, then the expense of responding to the discovery request comes straight out of the attorney's wallet. It is no surprise that surveys show that, in high proportions of cases, at least one litigant believes the adversary is conducting excessive discovery. 205 Moreover, in addition to creating the possibility of incorrect perceptions of discovery excess, the discovery process creates new opportunities for unscrupulous lawyers actually to oppress their colleagues and gain unfair advantage. The introduction of discovery into litigation is like the introduction 206 of the machine gun onto the battlefield. In the wrong hands, the new weapon creates many new opportunities for litigation mayhem and destruction.
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 49:465
The discovery process functions well only in a system in which all participants cooperate. It is a bad fit in the United States' adversary system in 207 which everything else assumes and encourages zealous advocacy, the exact opposite of cooperation.
208
The hurt and mistrust among lawyers that the discovery process creates infects their relationships outside the courtroom. Lawyers now view themselves less as part of a cohesive, proud profession and more as lone gladiators, mistrustful of the knife in the back from a colleague. 209 Fourth, broad discovery violates norms of privacy. Before 1938, a societal expectation existed that things said or written in privacy would remain private. 210 The Supreme Court's enforcement of a right to privacy reflects this norm.
211
The discovery process violates this norm. Many private discussions and written communications are unprivileged and discoverable. For example, those 212 who have not become deadened to the system-especially foreigners-may often be shocked that a litigant may obtain copies of almost all of a corporation's private emails. In the Microsoft antitrust case, the government's most powerful 213 evidence was informal internal emails between Microsoft's top leadership.
214
Likewise discoverable-for example in a divorce proceeding-are the contents of an individual's computer, including the embarrassing websites that the person has visited and love letters that the person has received.
215
Something important is lost when private individuals may not communicate in private without the constant threat that government agents-and that is what the courts are-will listen in. If everyone were not so accustomed to discovery's intrusiveness, everyone would see more clearly that the discovery process brings the United States frighteningly close to the world in Orwell's 1984. Only here, 216 Big Brother is a court enforcing an order compelling discovery.
217
The United States is alone in allowing the courts to intrude in this way into privacy. For example, European legal systems are motivated much more deeply 218 by an underlying expectation of the privacy of both personal and business information. Both economic theory and historical experience lead to the same conclusion: the legal profession was pushed irresistibly to hourly billing by economic pressures that resulted from wide-open pretrial discovery. By creating unbearable cost uncertainty for lawyers who handled litigation matters, wide-open discovery forced lawyers and, surprisingly their institutional clients, to demand that the traditional forms of fixed fees be abandoned in favor of hourly billing. 220 After tracing the path by which wide-open discovery caused the change to hourly billing, this Article discusses some of the harms of hourly billing. Because discovery caused hourly billing, these harms stem indirectly from discovery. As will be shown in a later section, elimination of discovery might permit the profession to return to fixed fees, as in other countries.
A. The Path From Discovery to Hourly Billing
In the middle of this century, imposition in the United States of broad pretrial discovery was followed by the emergence of hourly billing as the primary method of calculating attorney's fees. 221 As astonishing as it might seem to lawyers who recently entered practice, the standard billing practice has not always been billing by the hour. Lawyers 222 began to use hourly billing widely only in the last three decades. Until the mid-223 1960s, the normal fee contract provided for some form of a fixed fee, whether a monthly or yearly retainer, a fixed fee for a given task, or a contingency fee.
224
Unlike hourly billing, a contingency fee is a form of fixed fee because it does not change directly with the amount of work that the lawyer does. However, 225 during the 1960s and early 1970s, much of the legal profession switched to hourly billing.
Instead of paying a fixed fee, the client would pay for each 226 hour that the lawyer devoted to the client.
227
It was not coincidence that hourly billing became dominant after the adoption of rules that encouraged discovery. These two fundamental changes in the 228 practice of law were linked. Related forces caused the profession also to switch to hourly billing for transactional work.
231
The system of wide-open discovery pushed the legal profession to embrace hourly billing for litigation because discovery increased uncertainty about litigation costs. To explore this connection, a brief description is helpful of a 232 theoretical economic model of the conditions under which client and lawyer will choose either fixed-fee or hourly billing. 233 The model suggests that the optimal contract will be influenced by a balancing of two concerns: efficient risk distribution and limiting 'moral hazard'-moral hazard is the danger that a fixed-fee contract will induce the lawyer to conduct too little work and that an hourly contract will induce excess work. Economic forces will encourage the client and lawyer to choose the 234 contract type that offers the lowest sum of risk costs and costs from moral hazard.
235
The historical record suggests that, before the expansion of pretrial discovery, the fixed-fee contract tended to be optimal for litigation matters because its combined costs for risk and moral hazard were lower than those for the hourly contract.
Lawyers for institutional clients provide a useful 236 example. Because these lawyers tended to be more risk averse than their 237 institutional clients, the fixed-fee contract's shifting of some cost risk to these lawyers was mildly inefficient; the fixed-fee contract required the risk-averse lawyer rather than the more risk-neutral client to absorb unexpected costs.
238
However, the inefficiency was small because, before the introduction of broad discovery, cost uncertainty was small. This small inefficiency was more than 239 made up for by the fixed-fee contract's elimination of the moral hazard to conduct excess billing that an hourly contract would have created.
240
The model shows that if cost uncertainty increases and lawyers are more risk averse than their clients, then it will be efficient for the lawyer and client to switch to hourly billing. Hourly billing will begin to benefit both the client and 241 the attorney, and both will prefer it and demand it. 
B. Hourly Billing's Harms
Like the discovery process, hourly billing has harmed the profession in many ways. Commentary on hourly billing's harms is profuse, with a common summary being that hourly billing has ruined the practice of law. 290 Confronting these harms, the ABA established its Commission on Billable Hours. The preface to commission's report, written by the ABA's president, 291 provides a good summary of hourly billing's impacts:
It has become increasingly clear that many of the legal profession's contemporary woes intersect at the billable hour. . . Today, unintended consequences of the billable hours model have permeated the profession. A recent study by the ABA shows that many young attorneys are leaving the profession due to a lack of balance in their lives. The unending drive for billable hours has had a negative effect not only on family and personal relationships, but on the public service role that lawyers traditionally have played in society. The elimination of discretionary time has taken a toll on pro bono work and our profession's ability to be involved in our communities. At the same time, professional development, workplace stimulation, mentoring and lawyer/client relationships have all suffered as a result of billable hour pressures.
The profession is paying the price. Disaffection with the practice of law is illustrated by a feeling of frustration and isolation on the part of newer lawyers who, due to time-billing pressures, are not being as well mentored as in the past. Time pressures also result in less willingness on the part of lawyers to be collegial, which only exacerbates work load since it necessitates that everything be put in writing. Not coincidentally, public respect for lawyers has been waning since the 1970s.
292
Because hourly billing ties a law firm's income directly to how many hours its lawyers work, pressures naturally develop for the firm to require its lawyers to work more hours. This is regardless of how productive they are during those 
